Dispute in Bay of Bengal

I wrote previous articles (The Maritime Boundary and India-Bangladesh Maritime dispute in Bay of Bengal) on maritime boundary between India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. I also emphasized on getting the dispute in to the International Court of Justice. At last, a step towards the right direction has been taken by the Bangladesh Govt. Instead of waiting and tolerating the status quo, they’ve started rolling the balls. They sent legal notice to India and Myanmar to take them to court.

I would be eagerly following the developments around this case. India and Myanmar argued on equidistant principle to resolve the dispute. Bangladesh pointed to equity and wanted to bend the equidistant line due to concave nature of their coastline. There are previous instances of court cases in favour of both arguments.

The outcome, whatever it is, won’t be a zero sum solution. It could go either way, i.e. Bangladesh may or may not get the desired maritime area. I could think of  various different possibilities. Bangladesh may win it against Myanmar, but may not against India if population is considered a major factor in delimitation of maritime boundary. The equidistant line could be bent, but not as much as Bangladesh wants – could be another possible solution. Or, the best result for Bangladesh would be to get what they want.

Interestingly, in either of these cases, it may seem that someone “will lose” at least something. Looking closer, currently none exploits the resources of this disputed zone. So, none will at least materially lose anything. But, politically, if the game is played, it would always have a great impact on politics of Bangladesh and Myanmar – may be to some extent in West Bengal too. The outcome would be published in around 2014-2015, when a new Govt in Bangladesh would be in power. If it goes against Bangladesh, it could create political turmoil. In Myanmar, a potential crack between the Junta and the Chinese could arise out of this if China doesn’t see Myanmar through this case.

Whatever the outcome be, I want the proxy wars in Bay of Bengal to stop and everyone should respect the verdict of the court. I am still hopeful that court arbitration would prove to be a better tool for dispute resolution, compared to small scale warfare.

More Articles to Read : Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and National Consensus

Reaction of India : India hopes arbitration would help solve maritime disputes

Reaction of Myanmar : Yangon unhappy over Dhaka’s bid for UN arbitration

Bangla Blogs – now in India

I saw a couple of them are coming up for bloggers of West Bengal. So far, Bangla blogging was an effort by bloggers Bangladesh and all blogging sites were hosted by Bangladesh groups. New efforts by Bangla speaking people in India won’t probably bring in competition since Bangladesh is far ahead in this area. I hope this would add a lot of quality materials in web.

Having said that, I must add that there were no troubles for Indians to write in Bangladesh blogs. They generally accommodate everyone cordially. Apart from core Indian political issues, almost every other Indian topics are also discussed in these blogs. I have been writing in quite a few of them and I am happy with them. The one hosted by a group of enthusiasts at sachalayatan.com stands out to be the best in the group, though somewhereinblog.com is the most popular one.

Welcome to the league -

1. Coffeehouseradda.com
2. Lotakambal.com

Happy Blogging !!!!

Tipaimukh : The Conclusion

I read a good, long but comprehensive account of effects in Bangladesh due to dam in Tipaimukh (Thanks to Zahidul Islam, from University of Alberta, Canada). Although I differ from him in a few aspects of technical matters, I agree to the core of his arguments. The Tipaimukh dam will be an Environmental and Ecological disaster for Bangladesh. I agreed to this several times when I wrote about this earlier.

The purpose of the Tipaimukh dam is to control flood (I argued this also in my earlier article) and all the potential losses are tied to it. But flood itself is a part of ecology. Once flood is controlled, everything associated with it will face the consequences. The typical floodplain ecology consists of seasonal wetlands, alluvial plane and animals dependent on them. On the other hand, floods cause damages too. It disrupts roads, damages human habitat and causes heavy damage to economy.

I found that a large section of lower riparian living in Silchar and surroundings – are actually in favor of the dam. If you cross the international boundary and move to Bangladesh – the supporters would be few and far between. How can you reconcile this information? I agree that political climate in both of these countries do differ. In India, the discussion is much about how would it control floods and in Bangladesh the discussion is more about what possible disasters can it cause. Although, these are flip sides of the same coin – each side of the international boundary will have their own version of effects based on their own knowledge. In Indian side, they know it would control floods but doesn’t even know that it will reduce the fish catch, decrease silt deposits and dry up floodplain wetlands. On the other hand, in Bangladesh people know the latter part of the story and don’t want to believe that it would actually control flooding.

The political awareness alone can not explain the whole phenomenon. There is a huge gap in their effort to develop the country. India is more focusing on pulling people out of Agriculture and engaging them in other productive sectors, i.e. to it’s booming services and industrial sector. Bangladesh is still not have developed any alternatives to agriculture for occupation. The fun part is, officially both countries have approximately 70% population dependent on Agriculture. The difference is still in attitude. Indian would love to develop Silchar as a hub of BPO in North-East – resting on top of high literacy and English speaking skills of North-East India.

Silchar City and Barak river

This attitude is reflected in flood control too. Floods, as I said, are beneficial to fisheries, land fertility and ecosystem on a whole. A modern urban person cares much less about these than a villager. So an agricultural economy would consider flood as an one month problem and eleven month asset. An urban economy would see it as only a liability that must go. For an industrial economy, floods halts production and increases cost of maintenance. For agrarian economy, flood recharges the wetlands, deposits silt and brings more fish with it. All these are flip sides of the same coin – as a part of nature – it helps people who are adapted to it and it opposes people who dislikes the old way and want to unfetter themselves from the indigenous way of living. The former would want to control flood and the latter would prefer to live with the flood. There is no doubt that there are pros and cons in both side of the story. But, the end message is the same – massive efforts of flood control is a result of increased pressure of unplanned urbanization (look at the picture above – how Silchar city is located in the bank of Barak – any flood would affect it).

When I call something unplanned, it forces me to rethink. The urbanization in India (and Bangladesh too) was actually never a planned one. All towns and cities in India were actually villages or conglomeration of highly populated areas. As more fertile land attracts more people – most of Indian cities end up being in high flood prone zones. So in essence, that was reflected in post-independence Indian policy towards erecting dams – flood control was one of the major benefits projected. In Bangladesh, under similar plans, the average normal flood was controlled from 20% of land area to 10% of land area.

At the same time, when Bangladesh took up its own flood control project (also known as FAP), and implemented parts of it, there were protests among a large section of educated people. They opposed plans of unplanned flood control citing the benefits of flooding. The govt of Bangladesh, though, has stuck to its old position of controlling the flood rather than living with it. Even in 2005-2006 budget, Govt allocated 2.3 billion taka for flood control where the total budget is of 64 billion taka. At some point of time, Bangladesh also would need to get rid of agrarian economy. In an industrial world – floods are liability. It would inundate garments factory, disrupt exports to foreign countries and close down the educational institutes. Silt can be good for agro-lands but would anyone love it on concrete roads? Fishing can be fun in flooded urban areas but can it be a source of living for urban people? As population grows, more and more people in Bangladesh would take refuge to urban centers – as they are doing in India and China also. As they integrate themselves with the urban habitat, they will start looking at flood to be a liability.

Urbanization in Bangladesh

A glimpse of what needs to be done to mitigate flood damage in Bangladesh can be found in the causes of flood damage. As per Prof Khalequzzaman, the contributing factors are – Unplanned urbanization, Riverbed aggradation, Soil erosion, upstream deforestation, local relative sea level rise, inadequate sediment accumulation, compaction of sediments. Among these, the first and the foremost is the unplanned urbanization – all of Bangladesh cities are in natural floodplains and the expand in floodplains too. So, scope for “living with the flood” gets limited as people choose flood-prone areas for settlement. Increased people implies increased pressure on Govt to control flood. In a democracy, people drives country and not the other way around. Similarly, deforestation in Nepal and Indian upstream regions causes river to dump more and more silt on the riverbed. Embankments can provide temporary relief but it also increases sedimentation in the riverbed (Flood distributes silt – lack of flood puts everything in riverbed). The effect is described best at BWDB site about the flash floods in Northwest :

“This floodwater not only carries the water but also carry a huge amount of sediment originated mainly from hill. Over the time this sediment has deposited on the rivers and canals bed and has reduced the conveyance capacity more or less all of the water resources system with in the Haor area. As a result, when flash flood due to sudden heavy rainfall creates pressure on the water resources system, water easily overtopped and creates breaching at several locations on the submersible embankment eventually water quickly enter into the haor. Most of the cases, flood water comes into the haor very early in the monsoon and farmers are not get sufficient time to harvest their standing boro crop.”

Structural efforts are must to reduce harm done by flood. Flood ecosystem is not only controlled by dams and embankments, it also is controlled by forests, habitat and human population density. Once we can’t keep our forests, can’t keep the population at sustainable limit we would require structural intervention to stop natural revenge. Indigenous ways to mitigate flood damage can of course work with methods developed over thousands of years. But those methods were not developed for such high population density, neither those took account of urban culture and modern vehicles. Applying indigenous techniques to solve urban problems could bring disasters. The modern methods to live with the flood have problems too. The early warnings can save lives (so does the helicopter based rescue mission), but can they save property and financial damages?

I would be highly surprised therefore if Bangladesh changes its course from the current track of structural flood control and move to non-structural one. The other industrial and densely populated countries (Japan, the Netherlands) did it, China is doing it. And of course (as I mentioned in my previous article), all of them have taken inherent problems of flood control too. Flood is natural to Japan too. Japan is an island having high mountains in the middle. It’s expected to have heavy floods whenever it rains. They controlled it in order to protect its thriving manufacturing industry. Even today, most of Japanese lives in traditional floodplains and Japan loses 5 billion USD per annum on an average to floods (though it’s only 0.1% of their GDP). Of course, they lost their valuable wetlands too.

It may be argued that India is upper-riparian and hence it is pursuing such position. However, India is also pursuing plans to control floods in Bihar and UP by daming Kosi. India is completely a lower riparian in Kosi – having all floodplains at stake. But it will try to urbanize the area as time goes and hence the emphasize is on controlling floods. As an icing to the cake, dams geneate electricity too. Urban India would get less power cuts as dams come up. So, it’s India’s urbanization that it pushing it towards rampant flood control. Bangladesh is scheduled to join the race, very soon.

Debate : Should we control flood?

I read a string of articles on how to control flood. I also read a lot of articles on benefits of flooding and the ecosystem sustained by it. It seems that a debate is required in the beginning of each and every flood control project to determine the cost-benefit return of the project. The reason is counter-intuitive : Flood has both risks and benefits. I would like to quote from World Commission of Dams report in my article to articulate my position.

Each year flood events result in significant loss of property, life and livelihood in many countries. But on a small scale floods can be beneficial in providing groundwater recharge, silt deposits, floodplain fisheries and so on. Floodplains have played and continue to play an important role in the economies of many countries.

Physical flood protection infrastructure in the form of embankments and storage reservoirs cannot always provide full protection, and their effectiveness change with changes in river morphology and sedimentation. Additional management effort is required involving non-structural interventions such as flood forecasting, land use zoning, flood proofing, disaster preparedness, flood insurance and so on, either in parallel or independently from structural forms of protection.

As developing countries urbanize and industrialize, the financial consequences of flood damage will increase, and the demand for flood protection will intensify, leading to the need to construct more dams. At the same time such investment in flood protection often encourages settlements in floodplains, a rise in property values and pressure to provide more flood protection. Consequently it is likely that there will be a significant increase in flood physical protection structures, particularly dams, in the coming decades, to counteract the effects of climate change as well as to meet the needs of growing urbanization.

Risks of Flood Control

Flood is a part of ecosystem. Controlling flood will remove one part of the ecosystem – causing irreparable damage. To understand the damage, one needs to understand how the floodplain ecosystem works.

Floodplain Ecosystem

Floodplain rivers in their natural form are in a constant state of change, roaming about across unrestricted floodplains, creating and destroying side channels, backwaters, oxbow lakes, and a variety of other habitats. In this process, over long time periods, rivers maintain a relative balance between these various habitats a situation called “Dynamic Equilibrium”. The floodplain serves as an important part of the river itself, acting as a check valve to absorb high flows or flood pulses, as a kidney to cleanse runoff waters, as a mechanism of energy exchange, and as temporary and seasonal habitats for its biological components. In fact the presence of a periodic flood pulse is a key factor in maintaining a healthy river ecosystem.

The typical damages done once flood is artificially controlled -

• Damage to shallow floodplain aquifers and subsequent damage to plants and animals dependent on it
• Impact on migratory species
• Loss to direct silt and nutrient replenishment leading to gradual loss of fertility

Mitigation : Managed Floods

The WCD Knowledge Base includes a number of cases where artificial floods have been released from large dams to regenerate the natural resource base of downstream floodplains for local livelihoods (for example Manantali dam in Mali and Senegal and the Pongolapoort dam in South Africa). Managed floods generate economic benefits when downstream communities depend on natural, flood-maintained resources such as grazing, flood-recession agriculture and fishing (see Chapter 4). For example, on the Tana River, Kenya, a released flood from the planned Grand Falls scheme would have a net present value of at least $50 million for the downstream floodplain economy. Managed floods also entail an opportunity cost which may be greater or lesser depending on the value of the released flood waters to the dam for irrigation, hydro-power or other uses. A set of preliminary studies show that in some cases there are clear net economic benefits to these releases and in other cases the opportunity costs exceed the
value of downstream benefits that were identified, quantified and valued in economic terms. The potential for managed floods is often constrained by the design of the sluice-gates, sedimentation in the reservoir and in downstream
channels and the development of infrastructure on areas previously prone to flooding. Another constraint may be the political will to support traditional means of livelihood at the expense of benefits from the dam.

How to Manage Flood

Reducing the scale of floods  - It includes better catchment management (afforestation), Controlling runoff (by creating reservoirs), Detention basins (to bypass excess water), Dams (to control flow), Protecting wetlands.  Example – Large dams in Japan have dramatically reduced the sudden arrival of floods in populated areas where the rivers are exceptionally steep and short, and susceptible to flash floods.

Isolating the threat of floods - It includes Flood embankments (dykes and other structures to enable better drainage), Flood proofing (waterproofing walls; fitting openings with permanent or temporary doors, gates, or other closure devices; fitting one-way valves on sewer lines), limiting floodplain development (not to build any major infrastructures in floodplains).

Increasing people’s coping capacities - Emergency planning, Forecasting, Warnings, Evacuation, Compensation, Insurance. The last option is really interesting one as it avoids most of the observed shortcomings of the earlier ones. It includes :

• integrated catchment and coastal zone management, and wise planning and use of floodplains and coastal zones;
• empowering local communities to make choices about land development and flood alleviation;
• reducing the impacts of humans on the environment by promoting flood disaster resilience;
• valuing and preserving the best of indigenous adaptations and improving local capacities to respond;
• addressing problems of equity (for example alleviating poverty and lack of access to resources as a means of addressing
• flood vulnerability)

Emergency planning and management has three phases: preparedness, response and recovery. The capacity of individuals, households, groups, and communities to cope with flooding depends upon

• their knowledge, resources, organization and power
• their knowledge about how to identify that a flood threatens, how to mitigate effects of floods, what to do before, during and after a flood, the causes of flooding and appropriate mitigation measures;
• the resources at their command, including their skills and physical assets, and the support of others that they can call upon;
• the extent of their organization, including within households, within neighborhood groups, and within whole communities, as a way of pooling knowledge, skills, resources, and planning and coordinating activities to achieve optimum use and power in relation to other groups in society.

A flood management strategy will need to cover flood warnings, flood mitigation, any necessary evacuation and post-flood recovery. A clear commitment by national or federal governments to the emergency planning and management process will enhance its effectiveness.

Conclusion

Flood Damage Cycle

If we compare between method 1,2 and 3 for managing (the third one does not actually ‘control’ but let flood to occur) flood the third one has almost no impact on the environment and ecosystem since flood is not stemmed. It is the most eco-friendly approach towards managing flood. So, why don’t people adopt it always?

The answer to it could be obtained by the countries those successfully adopted first two options. The Netherlands and Japan built their flood management system broadly based on structural measures – the Netherlands built dams, embankments and artificial drainage, while Japan built a series of reservoir dams to stem the flash flood. They both sacrificed a significant amount of bio-diversity and ecosystem to build up their industrial infrastructure. The third option to let the flood continue can not work with modern day infrastructures. That is the biggest drawback of that method.

I believe all these three could be used together with an appropriate mix to obtain the best result. To decide on the ration in the mix the floodplain ecosystem needs to be studied, the losses need to be appropriated and corresponding benefits should be evaluated. A debate on cost-benefit will help all of the interested parties to come to a correct conclusion.

Source

1. World Commission of Dams report – chapter 2, 3 and 5

2. Flood plain ecosystem by Jerry L. Rasmussen, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service

Further Studies

1. Rhine river ecosystem restoration (The Netherlands, Germany, France)

“stretches of the originally freely flowing Rhine and its numerous tributaries, such as the Mosel, Main and Neckar, have been turned into a series of impoundments. Numerous engineering measures along the main channel of the Rhine and of almost all its tributaries have fundamentally changed the hydrological and morphological conditions. More than 85 percent of the floodplains have been cut off from the Upper and Lower Rhine leading to a considerable loss of habitat and of animal and plant species typical of the river.”

2. The Land Reclamation in the Netherlands – the other face of the story

The loss of estuarine environments in the deltas of the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt is a good example of the effects of excluding natural environments in decision making processes (Saeijs, 1999). Of the original 8,660 km2 of estuaries in this delta in 1900, there remain only 3,930 km2 in 2000: more than 54% of estuarine environment (4,730 km²) has disappeared within one century. When Costanza’s key figures (1997) are applied to these estuaries and the new systems, the Gross National Nature Product of the estuaries in 1900 is estimated to have been ca. $4 16 billion per-annum. These water-systems would presently represent a capital value of ca. $ 336 billion. Of course, the figures are not absolute, but indicative. However, the message the figures convey is clear. Taking in account the gains of the new land and lakes, the loss in national nature product amounts to $ 8.8 billion per-annum while the net production loss can be estimated at $ 6.6 billion. The net loss in capital is estimated $ 138 billion. These costs of estuarine destruction have never been included in decision making tools like cost-benefit analyzes during projects like the so-called Zuyderzee project and the Delta project. …….. For example, the cause of ever increasing water levels in The Netherlands is a result of 500 years of land reclamation in the floodplain and un-sustainable use of the rivers’ resources.

3. How Japan damaged their ecosystem and how they are trying to recover

“Human impacts such as river engineering, agricultural development, invasion by nonnative species, and urban development have degraded aquatic ecosystems throughout Japan (Yoshimura et al. 2005). Since 1868, wetland area has decreased by approximately 60% (GSI 2001). Recently, the appearance of once common species such as medaka (Oryzias latipes, or Japanese rice fish) in the Red Data Book of Japan has shocked the public (MOE 2003). Today the conservation of aquatic ecosystems is of great importance in Japan, and many countermeasures have been implemented to slow or reverse the degradation of river habitat (MLIT 2001, ESJ 2002). In 2004, for example, the Invasive Alien Species Act was implemented to eradicate certain invasive species and to regulate their import, dispersal, and spread.”

4. Environmental Aspects of Integrated Flood Management

5. Bigger, Better, Bolder (Netherlands land reclaimation)

“Marsh areas that depended on the right balance of salt and fresh water are slowly dying as fresh water takes over. Where shrimp, mussels and oysters once thrived, invasive freshwater zebra mussels the same species that plague U.S. waterways have taken up residence. … Scientists are hoping to try this approach on a larger scale. The new philosophy calls for reversing the whole trend line of Dutch history: Giving up some reclaimed land and letting water reclaim it. The general idea is that if water has more space, it is less likely to flood inhabited areas.”

6. The Eastern Scheldt barrier: Environmentally friendly engineering? by HUIB DE VRIEND

7. Fisheries was destroyed in Isahaya Bay, Japan by Stanley

“Moreover, other economic consequences are making themselves apparent. Tairagi (pen shell in English) is another species symbolic of the Ariake Sea, and since the closure of the dike, the number harvested has plummeted and catches of various species of fish off the Shimabara peninsula are dropping. It seems that the sacrificed tideland was a nursery for the young of various species and the smaller creatures that make up the base of the Ariake’s food chain. The cosmetic compromise of opening the narrow gates for a limited period of time cannot restore the intricate mosaic of life in Isahaya Bay or the Ariake Sea as a whole. We are witnesses to the death of a wetland of vast importance.”

8. How Fisheries were affected by Dutch Delta-works

“The salmon case clearly shows that one-sided promotion of navigation and hydropower interests harmed the ecosystem and fishery interest despite a treaty on salmon preservation.”

Salmon Catch over years in Rhine

The Mumbai Attack report on Channel4

Ultimately Channel4 has presented us with what we call an complete version of the entire 26/11 attack in Mumbai. It includes tapes from Kasav’s confession, the communication between terrorists and their commander in Pakistan and of course interviews of scores of people.

Initially the whole documentary was available at youtube, but unfortunately it was removed due to copyrights claim by Channel4 (they need their cut too!!). I hope some Indian Tv broadcasters will be able to purchase the copyright to air the same uncut version of the whole documentary. Otherwise, Indians will miss something. I want it to be displayed with few more analysis and interviews – initially by NDTV or IBNLive and later in the National Tv network. We all have right to see what had happened.

Currently the video is available at this site. However, it could be gone anytime soon. I’ll keep updating this post if I find any new site hosting the video.

P.S. – The video, especially the communication between the commander and the terrorists has significant amout of religious content. This should not be used to make a case against some other innocents. I’m afraid it could potentially happen. All these attacks are creation of a handful zealots and those should not be regarded as representetives of their communities. In fact people across the world have condemed this attack irrespective of caste, creed and religion. Punishing the guilty is the only way forward …

The Report on BSF Atrocities

Channel 4 correspondent Jonathan Rugman made an excellent report on BSF atrocities against Indians and Bangladeshis living near the Indo-Bangladesh border. It started with Indian border fencing project, then moved to a potential Bangladeshi migrant family and their problems, interviewed a Bangladeshi village having scores of people killed by BSF. After that he moved to India and filmed in some Indian villages who lost a lot of people murdered by the same BSF.

Quotes from Jonathan Rugman’s personal blog -

“Some of those shot are undoubtedly Bangladeshi cattle rustlers. Bangladeshis need to import Indian cows because they doesn’t have enough cattle or grazing land of their own. … Yet the fence and the guards along it are making it deadly for cattle rustlers to bring their livestock across.”

“At a Bangladeshi morgue, Channel 4 News filmed stacks of death certificates of those killed by Indian soldiers. The doctors told us the bodies are always handed back to their families. But nobody has even heard of Indian soldiers being prosecuted for any crime.”

“… when you travel down the Indian side of the fence, you find that the Indians have killed even more of their own villagers than they have Bangladeshis. In the village of Baliasisha, local Hindus crowded round us in scenes the mirror image of Muslim villages in Bangladesh; mothers grieving over sons, men mourning their brothers, all shot by Indian patrols.”

“Some 65,000 Indians live in villages in the “no man’s land” beyond the fence. To get to these villages, they have to be fingerprinted by Indian soldiers in case any Bangladeshi tries sneaking back across. These Indians are nicknamed the “nowhere people”; if they try crossing the fence without permission, or break the nighttime curfew, they could be shot by their own troops.”

Now the billion dollar question remains – How to get rid of this situation?

One obvious answer you get in Indian media is that the fence should be shifted closer towards zero line – so that no Indian remains on the “other” side of it. Since the Indo-Bangladesh treaty of Friendship (treaty signed between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujib) has expired in 1998, India can push for it. The supporters of this also shows “better record” of rival Indian and Pakistani forces in Indo-Pak border (or in US-Mexico border), where the fence is at the (or being moved to) zero line. In fact in some areas of West Bengal, the fence is being shifted to zero-line to put a check on “smugglers” (these smugglers are often local people who have to show their courage to earn their bread and butter). The projected advantage is obvious – people won’t be killed while crossing an invisible line – the Indo-Bangladesh border. Instead, they will have a physical fence acting as a warning. The other option is that of joint patrol of the border by BSF and BDR – to communicate well among themselves.

However, the above mentioned proposition fails to explain what to do with a BSF personnel kills some villagers intruding a village, neither does it explain how so many Indians, whom they are supposed to protect, get killed by them. If a fence is at zero-line, that doesn’t stop them to aim at a person on the other side of the fence, does it? Nor does it explain how accommodating BDR would increase security since BDR also has an equivalent bad record especially during their recent mutiny.

I want to see this incident as a part of bigger picture. With scores of human rights abuse reports pouring in from Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Darfur or Palestine – the fate of the civilians who live with an armed personnel beside them – is often linked to how that personnel behaves. For them, being suspected equals facing death penalty. The armed personnel, powered by a gun, often commits Human rights abuse not only because some sort of “immunity clause” protects him (the above video also shows an Indian NGO who told that they lodged many complaints against BSF but never the offender was punished), but also because they know that it would be difficult to prove anything against them.

It’s high time to remove all those “immunity clauses” those protect Armed forces being convicted in general courts. The BSF chief has recently committed that they need a zero-tolerance towards human rights abuse. (Ironically, in the same period, seven people were killed) I am skeptic till he delivers something.

The real solution to this problem is in tracking down why actually people cross the border. While I agree that punishments can reduce some atrocities, but it can’t stop the smugglers who cross the border with a bag of rice or onion to get often as low as Rs 10. To stop cross-border smuggling, a broader framework for improvement of border people is required. A lot of trade (for example the cattle) should be made legitimate in the context of border area while it could remain banned in other parts. Some biometric (fingerprints) cards could be used for participating in these cattle trades and can be arranged at many places near the border. The so-called smuggling can be countered with ease of movement of goods to and from either side of the border again exclusively for people living in border area.

How India manages these armed forces is going to determine how India is going to perform in human Rights. Armed forces, by definition, are the keepers of human rights. If they do the same they are supposed to protect, the civilians become helpless. In some way or the other, these civilians needs to have more rights than what they have right now. Without empowerment of common people, a solution seems impossible.

Controversy : Are large dams good?

This is the part of World Commission of Dams report on large Indian dams.

Generally speaking, for centuries dams have played a key role worldwide in development. Dams were built all over the world to resolve the problems of spatial and temporal insufficiencies of natural precipitation resulting from growing needs. Dams were built to supply water, control floods, irrigate agricultural lands and provide for navigation. They have also been built to generate electric power. As technology advanced increasingly large dams and complex structures were undertaken.

As the President of ICOLD recently (Hoeg 2000) pointed out “fresh water resources were limited and very unevenly distributed. Seasonal variations and climatic irregularities impeded the efficient use of river runoff with flooding and drought having catastrophic consequences”. He claimed that about 45 000 dams higher than 15m (and about 800 000 smaller ones) “were improving the living conditions of many of the world’s six billion people.”

Different countries or regions, at different stages of development, have developed and will continue to pursue their own policies to face their challenges and fulfil their needs. These policies cannot be labelled intrinsically “bad” or “good” merely because they favour or oppose construction of large dams. The impacts of large dams are location specific. However, the recent debates on large dams have increasingly become polarised and polemical which has tended to cloud issues.

As development priorities changed, particularly in the affluent developed world, and experience accumulated, various groups argued that the expected economic benefits of large dams were not being obtained and that major environmental, economic and social costs were not being taken into account. In recent decades, proposals for new dams and even ongoing dams began to be questioned by affected interests and global coalitions. Some critics (Robbroeck, 1999) of this critical approach asked vehemently if the poor South should stop developing dams because some armchair critics in rich countries want to do whitewater rafting or salmon fishing, while profiting from the lifestyle enabled by decades of dam construction in their part of the world. Yet others (Economist, 1997) point out that predictions of ecological doom have such a poor track record that they should be taken with a pinch of salt. This second group argues that it is possible to be in favour of the environment without being a pessimist. There ought to be room in the environmental movement for those who think that technology and economic freedom will make the world cleaner and will also take the pressure off endangered species.

Large dams have become the subject of controversy and a growing international debate in which India has also been caught up. As India is influenced by the monsoon regarding its water resources, the need for such large dams and storage schemes has been felt even more acutely. However, untill India became an independent nation there was acute poverty and frequent famine with too little economic activity. By the time India launched her belated planned development, the world had gone forward leaving a large gap between the industrialised nations and the poor developing countries. In the 1950s, 1960s and even early 1970s, there was also very limited awareness of the environmental and social issues relating to large dams. The most visible impact of a large dam lay in the submersion of lands and the displacement of people. It has also been pointed out (Verghese, 1999) that while dams displace, so does acute deprivation, but to a far greater degree: also that while the migrants of deprivation are just condemned, those displace by reservoirs are a charge on the Project, with a better package of rehabilitation. It is important to consider not only those displaced by dams, but also those afflicted by drought (Omvedt, 1999).

It is true in many cases that displacement was seen more as an inevitable concomitant of development. There was no dedicated agency or system for dealing with the trauma of displacement or for handling rehabilitation sensitively. It is however equally true to say that India was on a learning curve, which is not the same thing as condoning mistakes, if any, of the past. The question remains if any scientific endeavour has advanced without some mistakes, for example, would NASA stop its shuttle programme because of some failures, would roads or railways be discontinued because accidents continue to happen on them? Rather, such setbacks provide opportunities, for instance, the rehabilitation package for the Sardar Sarovar Project is a vast improvement on how such issues were looked at earlier. Even globally, it was perhaps the World Environment Conference at Stockholm in 1972 that awakened consciences and brought into focus the social, environmental and economic impacts of large dams.

In India, few large dams have aroused as much controversy or such a bitter campaign of hatred as the Sardar Sarovar Project. It had been likened by some to a disaster and yet regarded by others as the most desired and most delayed answer to their problems. Pressure was brought to bear on the World Bank to “step back” from this project, virtually terminating the approved loan. The Sardar Sarovar Project is not an isolated case; there are many others which are the targets of virulent criticism.

In the enthusiastic build up of criticism against large dams, all the ills of faulty agricultural planning, improper use of the developed water made available by the dam, corruption in society, malgovernance, perceived inability of the Government to lay down and enforce right and progressive policies etc, are also heaped on the large dams themselves.

Some critics (Arundhati, 1999) seem to have already come to a firm conclusion that big dams do more harm than good and that in any case they are a brazen means of taking water, land and irrigation away from the poor and giving it to the rich. Large dams lay the earth to waste, they cause floods, waterlogging, salinity, they spread disease and so on.

Another analyst (Verghese, 1994:239-253) considers that these critics have not been able to prove their case by rational argument. He points out that the ecological impacts are greatly outweighed by project benefits in the absence of which environmental degradation, migration and distress would take a further toll. The benefits in each case are far greater than the costs, howsoever computed, and if social and indirect costs and benefits are compared, with and without the project, the net gains would be all the greater. Many analysts and even the Central Water Commission concur.

Arguments on the basis of the human rights of the displaced people, particularly the tribals have also been advanced to support the case against large dams. It has been argued (Arundhati, 1999) that no one should take the poor tribals away from their forests, their river, submerge their lands and sacred sites smash their community links and resettle them against their will. The counter arguments (Verghese, 1994) are forceful: It is wrong to attempt to divide Indians on the analogy of the tribals being akin to “indigenous” people, such as the American Sioux Indians. The tribal Indians of India are as much a part of “have-not India”. They too must have access to education, better health, and economic and social opportunity. The choice must be theirs. Under-privileged communities, including the tribals, are moving out from undammed catchments in vast numbers because of the lack of development and opportunity. Satisfaction of a basic water requirement must be considered a basic human right. There is clearly an emerging consensus (Gleick, 1998) which accepts the right to development itself as a basic human right.

The present study is concerned only with the development effectiveness of dams. This is not a study about irrigated agriculture or energy management in India. This is not a study on the social, environmental and economic discrimination that is deemed to be present in India today, nor an outline of the steps needed to make India a welfare state without any discrimination, as is indeed enshrined in India’s constitution.

The World Commission on Dams was set up to address the central issues of controversy with respect to large dams and to provide an independent review of their effectiveness in sustainable development.The Commission cannot deal with matters that are, appropriately, the concern of India, that need to be handled within the country by its lawful government and people. The India case study should, therefore, aim at eschewing passion and sentiment and seek to look at the scene objectively in the light of the Indian experience of large dams and the related needs and aspirations for the future as perceived by the Indian people as well as the lessons these might offer to the developing people of the world.

Tipaimukh Dam : The Impact Assessment

In my previous posting I complained about India hiding the data. I am proved wrong. The data on Tipaimukh is there – open for everyone on the internet. Now I hardly find a ground to accuse Government of hiding anything. It looks like the Environment Impact Assessment is open from 2007. It can be accessed here.

At the same time, I found Bangladesh also did impact assessment of Tipaimukh dam way back in 1993. The report was prepared as a part of Flood Control Project (part 6) and covers upside and downside of the project in details. As the earlier one, this is also open in the Internet for years. It’s me to get the blame as I didn’t search enough before I conclude anything.

Since the debated effects are mostly in Bangladesh side, we can go over what the impact assessment says. It was prepared by Sara Bennett and Mujib Huq as part of SNC Lavalin International & Northwest Hydraulic Consultants Ltd. Let’s go inside it.

In summary, it mentions -

“Operation of the proposed Tipaimukh Dam/Cachar Plain Project on the Barak in India would moderate flows along the Kushiyara River and upper Surma River, decreasing monsoon flood levels and substantially increasing dry season flows. Impacts during reservoir filling could be even more significant. Ramifications for biophysical and socioeconomic environmental components include changes in monsoon cropping, reduced infrastructure and homestead flood damage, slower post-monsoon drainage, increased dry season in-channel fisheries habitat and improved migration access in the pre- and post-monsoon seasons, and so on.”

The same was best dealt with in section 8 of the plan. Section 8.3.2 deals with the impacts which is detailed in 8.7.2. It says -

“The Tipaimukh Dam/Cachar Plain Project on the Barak in India will substantially alter discharges of the Barak where it enters Bangladesh at Amalshid. Available information suggests that monsoon peak flows would decrease by about 30% (from 5250 to 3500 m³ s^-1). Winter flows would double or triple, increasing 100 to 200% (from between 170 and 250 to 500 m³ s^-1). Of the monsoon peak decrease, monsoon flow in the Surma and Kushiyara Rivers would decrease by 800 m³ s^-1. Surma-Kushiyara and Surma-Sarigoyain floodplain discharges would decrease by the remainder of 1150 m³ s^-1.

The Surma and Kushiyara Rivers along their entire lengths, and part of their tributaries, are also affected. At Fenchuganj on the Kushiyara, for example, model monsoon peak flows decreased by about 20% (from 2900 to 2400 m³ s^-1). Peak levels decreased by 1 m (Regional Plan Figure 21A). Model winter flows increased by about 80% (from 250 to 450 m³ s^-1). Levels increased by almost 2 m.

Further downstream in the Kalni-Kushiyara, model water levels increased by as much as 0.3 m in the monsoon and 1.5 m in the winter and pre-monsoon periods, as a result of sediment deposition. The affected reach extends as far as Ajmiriganj. By Bhairab Bazar, model flows and levels are almost unchanged from current conditions. In a simulation based on a drier year than 1991, however, model winter flows might increase significantly; simulated discharge hydrographs show that Bhairab Bazar winter flows are highly variable due to tidal effects.

Similar but somewhat smaller changes occur on the Surma (Regional Plan Figure 21B). At Kanaighat, model monsoon levels decrease by 0.5 m, while winter levels increase by 1 m or more. At Sukdevpur model water levels are almost unchanged from current conditions. … 

The potential Tipaimukh Dam/Cachar Plain Project, which the model indicates would decrease upper Surma and upper Kushiyara monsoon peak levels by 1.5 m and increase winter discharges by 100 to 200%, for conditions similar to those in 1991.Expected sediment deposition in the Kalni and lower Baulai, which the model indicates would increase pre-monsoon and post-monsoon water levels by as much 1.5 m.”

Under 8.5 it mentions -

“Projects which would be significantly affected by dam implementation are Upper Surma-Kushiyara, Surma Right Bank, Surma-Kushiyara-Baulai Basin, and Kushiyara-Bijna Interbasin“

It’s good to add that all the above mentioned projects were for controlling the flood. They will be irrelevant if flood is prevented upstream. The potential hazards are all mentioned in 8.8.1 and 8.8.2. The first of these is the Earthquake and next one is the any other dam failure condition.

“The region is known to be vulnerable to earthquakes. These events, though relatively rare are extreme in intensity, and can reverse existing morphologic trends and even induce re-configuration of the drainage system. The likelihood that during 1991-2015 the region would experience an earthquake of magnitude 7.6 (similar to the 1918 event, return period of 30 to 50 years) is between 40 and 60%; of magnitude 8.7 (similar to the 1897 event, the largest on record, return period of 300 to 1000 years) is perhaps 2 to 5%, assuming the events are random and can be described with a simple binomial probability model. … The Tipaimukh reservoir is huge (15,000 Mm³) compared with experience reported in the literature. In the event of a significant unplanned discharge, the river system in Bangladesh would respond (drain) rather slowly, as characterized by the outflow rate relative to the floodplain storage volume), such that most of the water released would remain ponded over the Northeast Region for some time. Assuming a release volume of 10 Mm³ and a ponded area of 100 km², the depth of flooding would be an average of 1.0 m above the normal flood level. … we show modelled flood waves for a test case of a instantaneous failure, 50 m wide extending to 100 m below the crest of the dam. Discharge and water level hydrographs are presented for three locations (Figure 11): at the exit from the mountain valley (km 80), at Silchar (in the middle of the Cachar plain, km 140) and at Amalshid (km 200). It can be seen from this that substantial attenuation of the flood wave would occur upstream of Amalshid and that the flood wave at Amalshid is a long-duration event.”

The other impact is mentioned in section 9.2.1. It notes -

“Dredging of the Kalni and Baulai appears to mitigate the effect of higher discharges in the post-monsoon season due to Tipaimukh Dam. Actual impacts would have differed if other upstream dam/irrigation scenarios had been adopted in the simulations.”

Now if one moves to the Indian EIA document, the entire 3.9 section would be found to deal with these issues. It covers almost all possible conditions. They have to be the same since it is Science.

If anyone is interested, he can go through those docuements and provide valuable feedbacks. I am not an expert and would not like to be one in short term. However I read both of them and I was satisfied with the mitigation effort and planning published in EIA and EMP documents. Whether all of them will be implemented – is another question needs to be dealt with.

The Reality and Consequences of Farakka

After I compiled a list of questions and answers on Tipaimukh I thought of doing a similar on Farakka also. Farakka may contribute 50% more water to Bhagirathi-Hugli river system but it contributes equally to animosity between India and Bangladesh. After talking to innumerable Indians and Bangladeshis, I felt both sides have a lot of wrong arguments. In the era of open information, there are enough information available on the internet to debunk a lot of myths around it. I am hopeful it would rather promote debate with more openness and fact based arguments.

95% of the flow of Ganges is in India and 99% of the catchment area is in India. Why is it at all an International river?

This was the initial argument from Indian side when Pakistan requested India to divulge the details of Farakka project. India claimed with a similar argument that since the river is not international at all, they can do whatever they want to. But this is totally false because even 1% of catchment area and 5% of river length is sufficient to make it an international river. (The numbers 95 and 99 are too high)

Since Ganges flows through India, India has right to do whatever it wants to with Ganges water. This is as per territorial sovereignty which is the basis of nation-state in current political world.

This typical argument is known as Harmon doctrine or the “Doctrine of Absolute Territorial Soverignty”. This doctrine has long been rejected due to the inequity created by it. This places the upstream countries in a commanding position by the virtue of their geographical position. (To know more – The law of international watercourses By Stephen C. McCaffrey)

Territoral sovereignty is flexible in case of any shared resources. All international laws agree to this. Professor McCaffrey wrote in reaction to the UN law of non-navigational watercourse :

“The fact that the basic obligation to provide prior notification of such changes was accepted as a part of the Convention by most delegations is, in itself, important: it provides further evidence that the international community as a whole emphatically rejects the notion that a state has unfettered discretion to do as it alone wishes with the portion of an international watercourse within its territory.”

The benefits of the water resources should be shared equitably between riparian states.

India has no right to obstruct the flow of the river Ganges since it is an International river. Diversion at Farakka has caused Bangladesh significant loss, therefore, it is illegal. Bangladesh should be compensated for this loss.

To argue against this myth, I would again refer to the same book – The law of international watercourses By Stephen C. McCaffrey. He points out that the most common argument against the Harmon doctrine is what he calls the “Doctrine of Absolute Territorial Integrity”. It argues

“… that the upstream state may do nothing that could affect the natural flow of the water into the downstream state.”

However, this was also trashed along with the Harmon Doctrine. Because this places the upstream  countries in a disadvantageous position. Although the river flows through the upstream country, they cannot use it only because they didn’t use it before. Most of the time, this is due to the geography of the area, which makes it easy for the downstream states to use the benefits of water resources – such as navigation, fishing and agriculture. As I mentioned in my previous section, the equitable sharing is the only legally accepted framework to deal with diversion case. Article 5 of UN law of non-navigational watercourse has established this and article 6 puts a few parameters for reaching an equitable agreement.

The law also do have a section dedicated to “Obligation not to cause significant harm”. However, the paragraphs under this clearly establish this obligation as a “Best effort” obligation. The first paragraph talks about “take all
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm” and the second one falls back to article 5 and 6 in case the significant harm is done. So, equitable sharing is the sole principle to determine fairness in sharing of Ganges water. At this point, one can go back to my old article and estimate what could be a fair sharing. I won’t comment further on the fairness of current sharing agreement, since I am not an expert on this. In my personal view, India did not take all appropriate measures to eliminate the extent of harm. But that does not establish the myth I am arguing against.

[To be continued ...]

Dam on Brahmaputra : Consequence and Reality Check

I have been reading about Chinese dams in Brahmaputra in Indian newspapers. As a typical lower riparian alarmist, most of the reports also add that China is planning to divert some of its water towards Eastern region, in addition to generation of 40,000 MW of electricity.

Great Bend of Brahmaputra

The Brahmaputra river follows an odd channel to flow to the sea. It flows towards east for almost half of its length in mountainous Tibet and then takes a U-turn (photo) to enter plains in Assam. Ultimately, it enters Bangladesh towards South and meets the Ganges before reaching the sea.

The place where it takes a U-turn, is known as Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra. At the same place, the river forms the deepest canyon of the world (Grand Canyon??). Only in 1998, a 30 mt waterfall was discovered nearby and since then China is planning to build a huge hydroelectric dam having an installed capacity of  40,000 MW.

The media reports also claim that there are proposals in China to divert some of rivers water too through the same dam to Eastern region. The author also claimed that China is planning to divert 40 BCM of water out of 71.5 BCM carried by Brahmaputra each year. One must remember that the water calculation is based on what it carries from Tibet to India. The same river has a runoff of an average of 550 BCM of water when it reaches Bangladesh. Where from this additional flow comes? There are two answers – the first is the Monsoon waters and the other is the water carried by the tributaries. The monsoon flow of  Brahmaputra is almost 10 times that of its dry season flow (Source : Page 39-40, Rivers and Riverine Landscape in North East India By Sutapa Sengupta).

Now let us look at the possibilities. The first is only the hydro-power generation. This does not change anything for India. Hydro-power generation is non-consumptive usage of water and should end up increasing the dry season flow by 10-20% – which should be good for irrigation usage in Assam and Bangladesh. The success of this plan depends on how the irrigation planning is done. I am hopeful that China will also sell some of the electricity to India since it may be a cheaper option for them.

The next topic to discuss the feasibility of this project. There are basically three different ways to implement the project. The first is to build hydro-dam only. The second is to divert water only during monsoon. The third is to divert a constant volume of water throughout the year.

The first sounds feasible and I have already discussed it. The second should also cause no harm to India. It is understandable that during Monsoon, it’s the excess water that causes the problem as it floods vast area in India and Bangladesh. It’s good for China as well since it is diverting the water to an area that does not get rainwater at the same time of the year. It will get water for 3-6 months when India or Bangladesh does not need it.

Chinese river-linking plan

The third one could potentially have dire consequences for both India and Bangladesh. It could be completed as the second phase of Chinese plan to interlink their rivers (this is how the first phase is). For India, the North-East is both food-surplus and water-surplus. After the diversion starts, the dry season flow could diminish by 20-30%. For a sandwiched Bangladesh, it’s time to share water with both Asian Giants – China and India. India is already taking 50% of Ganges water in the East. If Brahmaputra (Jamuna in Bangladesh) is compromised, it would virtually be a dry Bangladesh in lean season. A lot of alarmist authors also mentioned reduction in Hydro-power potential of North-East India due to Chinese diversion. I do not agree to them. First reason is most of planned hydro-power potential is actually in Brahmaputra tributaries. The lack in dry season flow would only block any “run-of-the-river” projects, but not anyone with a plan of reservoirs.

There are ways to cushion against the third problem as well. If Indians build reservoirs in Arunachal to hold the excess monsoon water, the condition should not be that bad. However, the loss of vast forest area and displacement of tribals from their land is regretted. The Indian Govt has already stepped a foot towards this (another post, news).

One thing to keep in mind that if India can not show any meaningful use of Brahmaputra waters, China has a right to divert them. This is why the first two plans has to be accepted by India even if it harms India. India does not “use” monsoon water, neither does it use the gradient of the Great Bend. The International law (though neither India nor China signed it) indicates the existing use as a parameter for equitable water sharing. China has already built a dam (photo) on Indus tributary. The first Chinese dam on Tsangpo is also coming up. So we don’t know what’s coming next.

Chinese diversion of Brahmaputra water

Before signing off, I would like to do a reality check on how this plan would work. If a viewer can identify the river Brahmaputra (Yarlong on the map) on top of India, he can see the red marked channel (or the dotted red line on the map above) from the same river passing a string of rivers to reach the Yellow river. The rivers crossed includes Salween, Mekong and Yangtze – three of the largest in Asia. In the first phase, the plan is to build a connector between Yangtze and Yellow river as a part of Western routes.

It is logical to believe that China cannot divert water from Yarlong (Brahmaputra) before it does so from Salween and Mekong. So far, China has built three dams on Mekong, two are under construction and there are four more to come (map). However, there are no plans to divert Mekong water yet. Once it starts diversion of Mekong, a series of political conflict is expected – especially with ASEAN states – something that China could hardly afford. This could potentially delay the plan to add further water in the channel. Therefore, in my opinion, even if China diverts Brahmaputra, it won’t be soon. Literally, there is no such possibility in next 30 years in my opinion. By that time, energy-hungry India should “tame” the Brahmaputra and have sufficient control over it. If India fails to do that, it would be our problem because we would fail to meet our goal despite the mitigation plan is available. It’s better not to be the “Cry Baby” if we know the problem beforehand.

I can’t term the projected dire consequences of the diversion plan anything other than a mere Conspiracy theory at this point of time. The importance that Indian media attaching to it – proves that lower riparian alarmist nature is Universal. The last thing I want is a political conflict over water. India needs good relationship with China. Alarmist media should do a reality check before they push forward their agenda to inject fear in common Indians.