The Mumbai Attack report on Channel4

Ultimately Channel4 has presented us with what we call an complete version of the entire 26/11 attack in Mumbai. It includes tapes from Kasav’s confession, the communication between terrorists and their commander in Pakistan and of course interviews of scores of people.

Initially the whole documentary was available at youtube, but unfortunately it was removed due to copyrights claim by Channel4 (they need their cut too!!). I hope some Indian Tv broadcasters will be able to purchase the copyright to air the same uncut version of the whole documentary. Otherwise, Indians will miss something. I want it to be displayed with few more analysis and interviews – initially by NDTV or IBNLive and later in the National Tv network. We all have right to see what had happened.

Currently the video is available at this site. However, it could be gone anytime soon. I’ll keep updating this post if I find any new site hosting the video.

P.S. – The video, especially the communication between the commander and the terrorists has significant amout of religious content. This should not be used to make a case against some other innocents. I’m afraid it could potentially happen. All these attacks are creation of a handful zealots and those should not be regarded as representetives of their communities. In fact people across the world have condemed this attack irrespective of caste, creed and religion. Punishing the guilty is the only way forward …

The Report on BSF Atrocities

Channel 4 correspondent Jonathan Rugman made an excellent report on BSF atrocities against Indians and Bangladeshis living near the Indo-Bangladesh border. It started with Indian border fencing project, then moved to a potential Bangladeshi migrant family and their problems, interviewed a Bangladeshi village having scores of people killed by BSF. After that he moved to India and filmed in some Indian villages who lost a lot of people murdered by the same BSF.

Quotes from Jonathan Rugman’s personal blog -

“Some of those shot are undoubtedly Bangladeshi cattle rustlers. Bangladeshis need to import Indian cows because they doesn’t have enough cattle or grazing land of their own. … Yet the fence and the guards along it are making it deadly for cattle rustlers to bring their livestock across.”

“At a Bangladeshi morgue, Channel 4 News filmed stacks of death certificates of those killed by Indian soldiers. The doctors told us the bodies are always handed back to their families. But nobody has even heard of Indian soldiers being prosecuted for any crime.”

“… when you travel down the Indian side of the fence, you find that the Indians have killed even more of their own villagers than they have Bangladeshis. In the village of Baliasisha, local Hindus crowded round us in scenes the mirror image of Muslim villages in Bangladesh; mothers grieving over sons, men mourning their brothers, all shot by Indian patrols.”

“Some 65,000 Indians live in villages in the “no man’s land” beyond the fence. To get to these villages, they have to be fingerprinted by Indian soldiers in case any Bangladeshi tries sneaking back across. These Indians are nicknamed the “nowhere people”; if they try crossing the fence without permission, or break the nighttime curfew, they could be shot by their own troops.”

Now the billion dollar question remains – How to get rid of this situation?

One obvious answer you get in Indian media is that the fence should be shifted closer towards zero line – so that no Indian remains on the “other” side of it. Since the Indo-Bangladesh treaty of Friendship (treaty signed between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujib) has expired in 1998, India can push for it. The supporters of this also shows “better record” of rival Indian and Pakistani forces in Indo-Pak border (or in US-Mexico border), where the fence is at the (or being moved to) zero line. In fact in some areas of West Bengal, the fence is being shifted to zero-line to put a check on “smugglers” (these smugglers are often local people who have to show their courage to earn their bread and butter). The projected advantage is obvious – people won’t be killed while crossing an invisible line – the Indo-Bangladesh border. Instead, they will have a physical fence acting as a warning. The other option is that of joint patrol of the border by BSF and BDR – to communicate well among themselves.

However, the above mentioned proposition fails to explain what to do with a BSF personnel kills some villagers intruding a village, neither does it explain how so many Indians, whom they are supposed to protect, get killed by them. If a fence is at zero-line, that doesn’t stop them to aim at a person on the other side of the fence, does it? Nor does it explain how accommodating BDR would increase security since BDR also has an equivalent bad record especially during their recent mutiny.

I want to see this incident as a part of bigger picture. With scores of human rights abuse reports pouring in from Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Darfur or Palestine – the fate of the civilians who live with an armed personnel beside them – is often linked to how that personnel behaves. For them, being suspected equals facing death penalty. The armed personnel, powered by a gun, often commits Human rights abuse not only because some sort of “immunity clause” protects him (the above video also shows an Indian NGO who told that they lodged many complaints against BSF but never the offender was punished), but also because they know that it would be difficult to prove anything against them.

It’s high time to remove all those “immunity clauses” those protect Armed forces being convicted in general courts. The BSF chief has recently committed that they need a zero-tolerance towards human rights abuse. (Ironically, in the same period, seven people were killed) I am skeptic till he delivers something.

The real solution to this problem is in tracking down why actually people cross the border. While I agree that punishments can reduce some atrocities, but it can’t stop the smugglers who cross the border with a bag of rice or onion to get often as low as Rs 10. To stop cross-border smuggling, a broader framework for improvement of border people is required. A lot of trade (for example the cattle) should be made legitimate in the context of border area while it could remain banned in other parts. Some biometric (fingerprints) cards could be used for participating in these cattle trades and can be arranged at many places near the border. The so-called smuggling can be countered with ease of movement of goods to and from either side of the border again exclusively for people living in border area.

How India manages these armed forces is going to determine how India is going to perform in human Rights. Armed forces, by definition, are the keepers of human rights. If they do the same they are supposed to protect, the civilians become helpless. In some way or the other, these civilians needs to have more rights than what they have right now. Without empowerment of common people, a solution seems impossible.

Controversy : Are large dams good?

This is the part of World Commission of Dams report on large Indian dams.

Generally speaking, for centuries dams have played a key role worldwide in development. Dams were built all over the world to resolve the problems of spatial and temporal insufficiencies of natural precipitation resulting from growing needs. Dams were built to supply water, control floods, irrigate agricultural lands and provide for navigation. They have also been built to generate electric power. As technology advanced increasingly large dams and complex structures were undertaken.

As the President of ICOLD recently (Hoeg 2000) pointed out “fresh water resources were limited and very unevenly distributed. Seasonal variations and climatic irregularities impeded the efficient use of river runoff with flooding and drought having catastrophic consequences”. He claimed that about 45 000 dams higher than 15m (and about 800 000 smaller ones) “were improving the living conditions of many of the world’s six billion people.”

Different countries or regions, at different stages of development, have developed and will continue to pursue their own policies to face their challenges and fulfil their needs. These policies cannot be labelled intrinsically “bad” or “good” merely because they favour or oppose construction of large dams. The impacts of large dams are location specific. However, the recent debates on large dams have increasingly become polarised and polemical which has tended to cloud issues.

As development priorities changed, particularly in the affluent developed world, and experience accumulated, various groups argued that the expected economic benefits of large dams were not being obtained and that major environmental, economic and social costs were not being taken into account. In recent decades, proposals for new dams and even ongoing dams began to be questioned by affected interests and global coalitions. Some critics (Robbroeck, 1999) of this critical approach asked vehemently if the poor South should stop developing dams because some armchair critics in rich countries want to do whitewater rafting or salmon fishing, while profiting from the lifestyle enabled by decades of dam construction in their part of the world. Yet others (Economist, 1997) point out that predictions of ecological doom have such a poor track record that they should be taken with a pinch of salt. This second group argues that it is possible to be in favour of the environment without being a pessimist. There ought to be room in the environmental movement for those who think that technology and economic freedom will make the world cleaner and will also take the pressure off endangered species.

Large dams have become the subject of controversy and a growing international debate in which India has also been caught up. As India is influenced by the monsoon regarding its water resources, the need for such large dams and storage schemes has been felt even more acutely. However, untill India became an independent nation there was acute poverty and frequent famine with too little economic activity. By the time India launched her belated planned development, the world had gone forward leaving a large gap between the industrialised nations and the poor developing countries. In the 1950s, 1960s and even early 1970s, there was also very limited awareness of the environmental and social issues relating to large dams. The most visible impact of a large dam lay in the submersion of lands and the displacement of people. It has also been pointed out (Verghese, 1999) that while dams displace, so does acute deprivation, but to a far greater degree: also that while the migrants of deprivation are just condemned, those displace by reservoirs are a charge on the Project, with a better package of rehabilitation. It is important to consider not only those displaced by dams, but also those afflicted by drought (Omvedt, 1999).

It is true in many cases that displacement was seen more as an inevitable concomitant of development. There was no dedicated agency or system for dealing with the trauma of displacement or for handling rehabilitation sensitively. It is however equally true to say that India was on a learning curve, which is not the same thing as condoning mistakes, if any, of the past. The question remains if any scientific endeavour has advanced without some mistakes, for example, would NASA stop its shuttle programme because of some failures, would roads or railways be discontinued because accidents continue to happen on them? Rather, such setbacks provide opportunities, for instance, the rehabilitation package for the Sardar Sarovar Project is a vast improvement on how such issues were looked at earlier. Even globally, it was perhaps the World Environment Conference at Stockholm in 1972 that awakened consciences and brought into focus the social, environmental and economic impacts of large dams.

In India, few large dams have aroused as much controversy or such a bitter campaign of hatred as the Sardar Sarovar Project. It had been likened by some to a disaster and yet regarded by others as the most desired and most delayed answer to their problems. Pressure was brought to bear on the World Bank to “step back” from this project, virtually terminating the approved loan. The Sardar Sarovar Project is not an isolated case; there are many others which are the targets of virulent criticism.

In the enthusiastic build up of criticism against large dams, all the ills of faulty agricultural planning, improper use of the developed water made available by the dam, corruption in society, malgovernance, perceived inability of the Government to lay down and enforce right and progressive policies etc, are also heaped on the large dams themselves.

Some critics (Arundhati, 1999) seem to have already come to a firm conclusion that big dams do more harm than good and that in any case they are a brazen means of taking water, land and irrigation away from the poor and giving it to the rich. Large dams lay the earth to waste, they cause floods, waterlogging, salinity, they spread disease and so on.

Another analyst (Verghese, 1994:239-253) considers that these critics have not been able to prove their case by rational argument. He points out that the ecological impacts are greatly outweighed by project benefits in the absence of which environmental degradation, migration and distress would take a further toll. The benefits in each case are far greater than the costs, howsoever computed, and if social and indirect costs and benefits are compared, with and without the project, the net gains would be all the greater. Many analysts and even the Central Water Commission concur.

Arguments on the basis of the human rights of the displaced people, particularly the tribals have also been advanced to support the case against large dams. It has been argued (Arundhati, 1999) that no one should take the poor tribals away from their forests, their river, submerge their lands and sacred sites smash their community links and resettle them against their will. The counter arguments (Verghese, 1994) are forceful: It is wrong to attempt to divide Indians on the analogy of the tribals being akin to “indigenous” people, such as the American Sioux Indians. The tribal Indians of India are as much a part of “have-not India”. They too must have access to education, better health, and economic and social opportunity. The choice must be theirs. Under-privileged communities, including the tribals, are moving out from undammed catchments in vast numbers because of the lack of development and opportunity. Satisfaction of a basic water requirement must be considered a basic human right. There is clearly an emerging consensus (Gleick, 1998) which accepts the right to development itself as a basic human right.

The present study is concerned only with the development effectiveness of dams. This is not a study about irrigated agriculture or energy management in India. This is not a study on the social, environmental and economic discrimination that is deemed to be present in India today, nor an outline of the steps needed to make India a welfare state without any discrimination, as is indeed enshrined in India’s constitution.

The World Commission on Dams was set up to address the central issues of controversy with respect to large dams and to provide an independent review of their effectiveness in sustainable development.The Commission cannot deal with matters that are, appropriately, the concern of India, that need to be handled within the country by its lawful government and people. The India case study should, therefore, aim at eschewing passion and sentiment and seek to look at the scene objectively in the light of the Indian experience of large dams and the related needs and aspirations for the future as perceived by the Indian people as well as the lessons these might offer to the developing people of the world.

Tipaimukh Dam : The Impact Assessment

In my previous posting I complained about India hiding the data. I am proved wrong. The data on Tipaimukh is there – open for everyone on the internet. Now I hardly find a ground to accuse Government of hiding anything. It looks like the Environment Impact Assessment is open from 2007. It can be accessed here.

At the same time, I found Bangladesh also did impact assessment of Tipaimukh dam way back in 1993. The report was prepared as a part of Flood Control Project (part 6) and covers upside and downside of the project in details. As the earlier one, this is also open in the Internet for years. It’s me to get the blame as I didn’t search enough before I conclude anything.

Since the debated effects are mostly in Bangladesh side, we can go over what the impact assessment says. It was prepared by Sara Bennett and Mujib Huq as part of SNC Lavalin International & Northwest Hydraulic Consultants Ltd. Let’s go inside it.

In summary, it mentions -

“Operation of the proposed Tipaimukh Dam/Cachar Plain Project on the Barak in India would moderate flows along the Kushiyara River and upper Surma River, decreasing monsoon flood levels and substantially increasing dry season flows. Impacts during reservoir filling could be even more significant. Ramifications for biophysical and socioeconomic environmental components include changes in monsoon cropping, reduced infrastructure and homestead flood damage, slower post-monsoon drainage, increased dry season in-channel fisheries habitat and improved migration access in the pre- and post-monsoon seasons, and so on.”

The same was best dealt with in section 8 of the plan. Section 8.3.2 deals with the impacts which is detailed in 8.7.2. It says -

“The Tipaimukh Dam/Cachar Plain Project on the Barak in India will substantially alter discharges of the Barak where it enters Bangladesh at Amalshid. Available information suggests that monsoon peak flows would decrease by about 30% (from 5250 to 3500 m³ s^-1). Winter flows would double or triple, increasing 100 to 200% (from between 170 and 250 to 500 m³ s^-1). Of the monsoon peak decrease, monsoon flow in the Surma and Kushiyara Rivers would decrease by 800 m³ s^-1. Surma-Kushiyara and Surma-Sarigoyain floodplain discharges would decrease by the remainder of 1150 m³ s^-1.

The Surma and Kushiyara Rivers along their entire lengths, and part of their tributaries, are also affected. At Fenchuganj on the Kushiyara, for example, model monsoon peak flows decreased by about 20% (from 2900 to 2400 m³ s^-1). Peak levels decreased by 1 m (Regional Plan Figure 21A). Model winter flows increased by about 80% (from 250 to 450 m³ s^-1). Levels increased by almost 2 m.

Further downstream in the Kalni-Kushiyara, model water levels increased by as much as 0.3 m in the monsoon and 1.5 m in the winter and pre-monsoon periods, as a result of sediment deposition. The affected reach extends as far as Ajmiriganj. By Bhairab Bazar, model flows and levels are almost unchanged from current conditions. In a simulation based on a drier year than 1991, however, model winter flows might increase significantly; simulated discharge hydrographs show that Bhairab Bazar winter flows are highly variable due to tidal effects.

Similar but somewhat smaller changes occur on the Surma (Regional Plan Figure 21B). At Kanaighat, model monsoon levels decrease by 0.5 m, while winter levels increase by 1 m or more. At Sukdevpur model water levels are almost unchanged from current conditions. … 

The potential Tipaimukh Dam/Cachar Plain Project, which the model indicates would decrease upper Surma and upper Kushiyara monsoon peak levels by 1.5 m and increase winter discharges by 100 to 200%, for conditions similar to those in 1991.Expected sediment deposition in the Kalni and lower Baulai, which the model indicates would increase pre-monsoon and post-monsoon water levels by as much 1.5 m.”

Under 8.5 it mentions -

“Projects which would be significantly affected by dam implementation are Upper Surma-Kushiyara, Surma Right Bank, Surma-Kushiyara-Baulai Basin, and Kushiyara-Bijna Interbasin“

It’s good to add that all the above mentioned projects were for controlling the flood. They will be irrelevant if flood is prevented upstream. The potential hazards are all mentioned in 8.8.1 and 8.8.2. The first of these is the Earthquake and next one is the any other dam failure condition.

“The region is known to be vulnerable to earthquakes. These events, though relatively rare are extreme in intensity, and can reverse existing morphologic trends and even induce re-configuration of the drainage system. The likelihood that during 1991-2015 the region would experience an earthquake of magnitude 7.6 (similar to the 1918 event, return period of 30 to 50 years) is between 40 and 60%; of magnitude 8.7 (similar to the 1897 event, the largest on record, return period of 300 to 1000 years) is perhaps 2 to 5%, assuming the events are random and can be described with a simple binomial probability model. … The Tipaimukh reservoir is huge (15,000 Mm³) compared with experience reported in the literature. In the event of a significant unplanned discharge, the river system in Bangladesh would respond (drain) rather slowly, as characterized by the outflow rate relative to the floodplain storage volume), such that most of the water released would remain ponded over the Northeast Region for some time. Assuming a release volume of 10 Mm³ and a ponded area of 100 km², the depth of flooding would be an average of 1.0 m above the normal flood level. … we show modelled flood waves for a test case of a instantaneous failure, 50 m wide extending to 100 m below the crest of the dam. Discharge and water level hydrographs are presented for three locations (Figure 11): at the exit from the mountain valley (km 80), at Silchar (in the middle of the Cachar plain, km 140) and at Amalshid (km 200). It can be seen from this that substantial attenuation of the flood wave would occur upstream of Amalshid and that the flood wave at Amalshid is a long-duration event.”

The other impact is mentioned in section 9.2.1. It notes -

“Dredging of the Kalni and Baulai appears to mitigate the effect of higher discharges in the post-monsoon season due to Tipaimukh Dam. Actual impacts would have differed if other upstream dam/irrigation scenarios had been adopted in the simulations.”

Now if one moves to the Indian EIA document, the entire 3.9 section would be found to deal with these issues. It covers almost all possible conditions. They have to be the same since it is Science.

If anyone is interested, he can go through those docuements and provide valuable feedbacks. I am not an expert and would not like to be one in short term. However I read both of them and I was satisfied with the mitigation effort and planning published in EIA and EMP documents. Whether all of them will be implemented – is another question needs to be dealt with.

The Reality and Consequences of Farakka

After I compiled a list of questions and answers on Tipaimukh I thought of doing a similar on Farakka also. Farakka may contribute 50% more water to Bhagirathi-Hugli river system but it contributes equally to animosity between India and Bangladesh. After talking to innumerable Indians and Bangladeshis, I felt both sides have a lot of wrong arguments. In the era of open information, there are enough information available on the internet to debunk a lot of myths around it. I am hopeful it would rather promote debate with more openness and fact based arguments.

95% of the flow of Ganges is in India and 99% of the catchment area is in India. Why is it at all an International river?

This was the initial argument from Indian side when Pakistan requested India to divulge the details of Farakka project. India claimed with a similar argument that since the river is not international at all, they can do whatever they want to. But this is totally false because even 1% of catchment area and 5% of river length is sufficient to make it an international river. (The numbers 95 and 99 are too high)

Since Ganges flows through India, India has right to do whatever it wants to with Ganges water. This is as per territorial sovereignty which is the basis of nation-state in current political world.

This typical argument is known as Harmon doctrine or the “Doctrine of Absolute Territorial Soverignty”. This doctrine has long been rejected due to the inequity created by it. This places the upstream countries in a commanding position by the virtue of their geographical position. (To know more – The law of international watercourses By Stephen C. McCaffrey)

Territoral sovereignty is flexible in case of any shared resources. All international laws agree to this. Professor McCaffrey wrote in reaction to the UN law of non-navigational watercourse :

“The fact that the basic obligation to provide prior notification of such changes was accepted as a part of the Convention by most delegations is, in itself, important: it provides further evidence that the international community as a whole emphatically rejects the notion that a state has unfettered discretion to do as it alone wishes with the portion of an international watercourse within its territory.”

The benefits of the water resources should be shared equitably between riparian states.

India has no right to obstruct the flow of the river Ganges since it is an International river. Diversion at Farakka has caused Bangladesh significant loss, therefore, it is illegal. Bangladesh should be compensated for this loss.

To argue against this myth, I would again refer to the same book – The law of international watercourses By Stephen C. McCaffrey. He points out that the most common argument against the Harmon doctrine is what he calls the “Doctrine of Absolute Territorial Integrity”. It argues

“… that the upstream state may do nothing that could affect the natural flow of the water into the downstream state.”

However, this was also trashed along with the Harmon Doctrine. Because this places the upstream  countries in a disadvantageous position. Although the river flows through the upstream country, they cannot use it only because they didn’t use it before. Most of the time, this is due to the geography of the area, which makes it easy for the downstream states to use the benefits of water resources – such as navigation, fishing and agriculture. As I mentioned in my previous section, the equitable sharing is the only legally accepted framework to deal with diversion case. Article 5 of UN law of non-navigational watercourse has established this and article 6 puts a few parameters for reaching an equitable agreement.

The law also do have a section dedicated to “Obligation not to cause significant harm”. However, the paragraphs under this clearly establish this obligation as a “Best effort” obligation. The first paragraph talks about “take all
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm” and the second one falls back to article 5 and 6 in case the significant harm is done. So, equitable sharing is the sole principle to determine fairness in sharing of Ganges water. At this point, one can go back to my old article and estimate what could be a fair sharing. I won’t comment further on the fairness of current sharing agreement, since I am not an expert on this. In my personal view, India did not take all appropriate measures to eliminate the extent of harm. But that does not establish the myth I am arguing against.

[To be continued ...]